In this study, the relationship between cyber warfare and the norms of international law will be examined. Especially the position of cyber warfare in terms of jus ad bellum and jus in bello will be analysed. From this point of view, it can be said that the concepts of cyber armed attack, cyber armed conflict and the law of cyber warfare are included in the area of international law. Yet the difficulties about non-physical features of cyber space necessitates a detailed examination with regard to international law. In this respect, the law of cyber warfare is in some ways an application of international law to the unknown.
Introduction
It is hard to give a comprehensive definition of cyber space. Yet cyber space can be defined as the world of web of computers where information is saved, shared and transmitted. 1 There are services to humanity as well as risks and threats in evolving cyber space. The spectacular developments in the computer technology differentiated threats to the national security and changed the nature of armed conflicts in the context of international law. Nowadays, the governments use social media for regime change and signals for espionage and start war online. 2 However, it is not certain which act is "cyber terrorism", what is "cyber-attack" and "cyber espionage" and what is "cyber warfare" in the global cyber space including civilians and armed forces in terms of international law. There is no specific international treaty about the law of cyber warfare. Despite the fact that an International Group of Experts prepared the Tallinn Manual which includes the rules about cyber warfare, it is not a binding set of rules in the nature of things. There is a problem emerging about the lacunae of international law with regard to cyber space and the application of the rules and principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello designing for the kinetic attacks to cyber warfare.
In this article, the issue of cyber warfare is examined in terms of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. At first, it will be analysed that what type of cyber act constitutes "use of force" and what kind of cyber-attack forms "armed attack" within realm of jus ad bellum. In this regard, the problems of widening of the United Nations Charter's norms to cyber space will be discussed. Secondly, the subject of cyber armed attacks will be elaborated within the context of jus in bello. Especially the matters of the principle of distinction and targeting of civilians/hackers by armed forces of states and other groups will be examined.
I.The Cyber Space and The Examples of Cyber-Attacks
Cyber space is an area of information. It comprises the generated, saved and shared digital data. Cyber space has four sub-elements such as material space: place, distance, size and route. 3 It is not only a virtual world, it combines the systems and infrastructures enabling the flow of data. One of the important feature of this space is that it is a man-made space. Cyber space is fragmentable and its fragments can turn on/off with one click.
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Impressive cyber-attack events have occurred in cyber space over recent years. For instance, DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks seeking the critical infrastructures of Estonia in the year of 2007 put a spotlight on cyber space. Estonia's accession to NATO in 2004 disturbed Russian ethnic minority and Russia itself. After that, the relocation of a bronze statute symbolizing the Soviet power and equal rights for Russian community in Estonia increased the uneasiness. Extensive protests started and this events named "Bronze Night".
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Aftermath of Bronze Night cyber-attacks were carried out against the web sites of Estonian government, banks and media. 6 Estonian government claimed that attacks were made by Russia but there was no certain evidence. But Gervais alleged like many others that "Russian 'hacktivists' used massive DDoS attacks to target Estonia's web servers and bring web traffic to a halt" 7 .
Georgia experienced massive cyber-attacks to telecommunication systems, the web sites of government and media by Russian hackers during the South Ossetia War in 2008. 8 A virus named Stuxnet deactivated a number of uranium enrichment centrifuges of Iran in 2010. 9 Despite that there is no certain proof which country is responsible, the virus is frequently described as an American-Israeli cyber weapon by computer experts. 10 In 2012, Saudi
Aramco, one of the biggest oil company in the world, suffered from outstanding cyberattacks. A news in CNN reported that "in a matter of hours, 35,000 computers were partially wiped or totally destroyed". 11 At November 2012 the Israeli government "said it has been hit with more than 44 million cyber-attacks since it began aerial strikes on Gaza last week" 12 .
Anonymous, a group of hackers, took responsibility for these cyber-attacks.
All these events show us that the facts similar to war and conflict can occur in cyber space. In this version of new wars 13 non-state actors join the conflicts and these conflicts take shape in non-material space instead of battlefronts.
II.Cyber Space and Jus Ad Bellum

1)The Norms on Kinetic Use of Force
The prohibition of use force became concrete as a norm in the Article 2/4 of the United Nations Charter: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
a)The Arguments About Which Acts Do Constitute Use of Cyber Force
The prohibition on the use of force within the context of cyber space concerns whether a cyber operation made by a state or attributed to a state is a violation of the prohibition. The Rule 10 of Tallinn Manual expands the scope of the prohibition on the use of force. The Rule 10 reads as follows: "A cyber operation that constitutes a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or that is in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, is unlawful" 25 .
ICJ refused the literal interpretation of the concept of the use of force in the judgment of the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua. The Court held that "the arming and training of the contras can certainly be said to involve the threat or use of force" and "that the mere supply of funds to the contras … does not in itself amount to a use of force". 26 Furthermore ICJ ruled that "assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support" could be regarded as the use or the threat of force.
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In this sense non-destructive cyber acts such as providing malicious software to rebels or training rebels for the use of this kind of software may constitute the use of force. The Rule 11 of Tallinn Manual suggests a formula for regarding an act as the use of force: "A cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force" 28 . Tallinn Manual adopted an effect based test and employed seven factors for determining process. Priyanka R. Dev listed and summarized these factors: "1. Severity: Analyze the level of harm or damage that was caused to individuals and property, with an eye towards the scale, scope, and duration of consequences.
2. Immediacy: Analyze whether the act had more immediate effects or consequences; if a violated state was given the opportunity to avoid or forestall the consequences (i.e., the consequences were less immediate), it is less likely that the act should constitute a use of force.
3. Directness: Analyze how direct the causation between the initial act and resulting consequences is; the more direct, the more likely it should constitute a use of force 4. Invasiveness: Analyze the degree to which a network system was penetrated; the penetration of a classified system should fall closer to a use of force than that of a declassified system. 5. Measurability: The more quantifiable and identifiable the consequences, the more likely the act is to constitute a use of force.
6. Presumptive Legitimacy: Consider whether the act is presumptively unlawful; if the act is explicitly unlawful, then the act is more likely to constitute a use of force.
7. State Responsibility: The greater the state involvement in the act, the greater the threat to international stability and the more likely the act is to constitute a use of force."
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This model broadens the scope of the concept of use of force, but it is helpful for states to analyse the particular cases.
30 Nevertheless these factors may not be helpful for determining process at the time of incident.
b)The Arguments About Which Acts Do Constitute Armed Cyber-Attacks
It is a problematic issue that which acts do constitute armed attack in international law. In the age of new wars, the concept of armed attack broadens and it must be interpreted broadly and result-based. 31 Organized cyber armed groups can carry out cyber-attacks against any state reaching the level of armed attack. These cyber-attacks trigger the right of self-defence of attacked state if other state which harbours the cyber-attackers is unwilling or unable to stop these acts.
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III. Cyber Space and Jus In Bello
Global cyber space became the integral part and means of modern armed conflicts. The use of cyber space as a weapon is not prohibited. This using should not be against the principles of distinction and proportionality such as other weapons. But cyber space is an amorphous space by its very nature. The seconds are important in cyber-attacks and it is hard to find perpetrators of cyber-attacks. These features of cyber warfare make things hard for the application of the norms of jus in bello to cyber space.
Civilians take an active role in modern armed conflict and they carry out defensive and aggressive cyber-attacks. This situation causes an uncertainty about the characterization of a person within the context of jus in bello. Who will be the legal targets in cyber space is the one of the hardest problem in the law of cyber warfare.
For instance, a British man named Junaid Hussain who is believed to have become the leader of a hacker group, CyberCaliphate, of ISIS in Syria was targeted by US drone strike in 2015.
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Ido Kilovaty argued that "Hussain's death represents the first time a hacker was lethally targeted" 36 . It can be said that targeting of hackers will be the one of the important debate of jus in bello in future. For this reason, surveying of the norms of jus in bello related to cyber warfare is a must.
1.The Types of Armed Conflicts
Jus in bello, or international humanitarian law, which is a specific area of international law is applicable only in times of armed conflict. Common Article 3 does not define non-international armed conflict and it refers the conflicts except that international armed conflict with a negative method. 41 The scope of this article is very disputable in the doctrine of international law. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held that "whenever there is … protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State" 42 . The Additional Protocol II applies to high intensity armed conflicts between government forces and organized armed non-state actors. 43 The Parties to this conflict must be "under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol" 44
2.The Concept of Direct Participation in Hostilities and Targeting Hackers
The area of today's wars becomes vague, the actors of these wars get more complicated and civilians are in the middle of the area of these wars. Along with the state armed forces, civilians participate modern war activities and sometimes civilians assist to the combatants as a result of loyalty. In these situations the protection of civilians and the principle of distinction weaken and when a civilian participate in hostility directly, this civilian lose protection and can be a legitimate target. But it is uncertain which act is deemed direct participation in hostilities. This characterization of acts is vital for civilians' lives. Furthermore the distinction of fighters and civilians in non-international armed conflict is important because the status of fighters is relatively continuous although the status of civilians who participate directly in hostilities is temporary. criteria is direct causation. Interpretive Guidance points out that "there must be a direct causal link between a specific act and the harm" 54 . In pursuant of frequently used example, driving an ammunition truck to actual war zone by a civilian is a direct causal link and moving ammunition from the factory to a port for shipment to conflict zone is not a direct causal link. Last criteria is belligerent nexus. In respect to this criteria an act must be designed to cause harm to other party.
It is necessary to emphasize that the notion of direct participation in hostilities is different from the notion of continuous combat function. The notion of continuous combat function is about the members of organized armed groups. When a person become a member of an organized armed group belonging to non-state party in armed conflict, this person ceases to be a civilian status. A member of an organized armed group constitutes a legal target during membership in an armed conflict. The rule about direct participation in hostilities does not apply to the members of organized armed groups who are in continuous combat function.
The notion of direct participation in hostilities appears in the Tallinn Manual. According to the Tallinn Manual, some cyber acts may form direct participation in hostilities. For example, a cyber-operation disrupting the enemy's command and control is a direct participation 55 , but "designing malware and making it openly available online, even if it may be used by someone involved in the conflict to conduct an attack, does not constitute direct participation" 56 .
However some cyber acts make a dispute among the International Group of Experts such as to steal funds by using cyber means. Emily Crawford notes:
"In some instances, systems are hacked simply for criminal, malicious, or mischievous reasons, with no nexus to the armed conflict; sites and networks are targeted simply because they can be. In such a case, the appropriate response would lie with domestic law enforcement, rather than under the law of armed conflict" 57 .
In addition to all these, Logan Liles points out that unlike the physical world "it is hard to assess the time frame in which a non-State cyber operator actually participates in hostilities" 58 and it is hard to ascertain direct participants in hostilities in cyber space.
Conclusion
The emerging law of cyber warfare has several disputed subjects and more studies on this legal domain must be written. In some ways the law of cyber warfare is an application of international to the unknown because of the non-physical features of cyber space. perpetrators of cyber-attacks, searching the location of cyber organized groups, determining the time of cyber acts are not an easy task. The norms of jus ad bellum and jus in bello came into existence in compliance with kinetic wars. Yet the fact of cyber warfare as an aspect of "new wars" necessitates the adaptation of international law norms to this new area of application. The clarification of the application of international law to cyber warfare needs more time, events, articles and studies on this subject. Abovementioned arguments on the law of cyber warfare can light the way for future application of international law.
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